What are the qualities a general should have? He should be wise, self-restrained, vigilant, frugal, tough, intelligent, free from avarice, neither too young nor too old, indeed a father, if possible, a good speaker, and a man with a good reputation (Onasander, Strategikos, ch. 1).
According to Onasander, these are the qualities supporting the choice of a good commander. During Claudius’ reign, Onasander, a Greek of unknown origin, wrote a treatise on strategy, entitled Strategikos: “Manual of the Commander”, but also “Manual on generalship”. The figure of the general outlined by Onasander is complex and includes an extremely wide range of skills, knowledge, and experience.
Does Onasander's general emerge from nowhere? On the contrary, he is the result and product of pre-existing figures and experiences, which have been handed down first and foremost from the historical sources. On the basis of the literary and theoretical operation performed by Onasander, we can consider that identifying the characteristics of leadership in each commander or politician is both a challenging and complex operation. This means not only extrapolating from each historical figure some abstract characteristics which define the common and abstract ideal of generalship, but above all focusing on the context in which each figure operates and carefully examining literary sources and other evidence.
We can say that this mission has been well accomplished by the collection of essays edited by Richard Evans and Shaun Tougher. There are many elements to consider in order to highlight the originality and merits of this book. First, we can appreciate the broad chronological spectrum, ranging from Homer to Manuel Comnenus (1143–1180). The book’s spatial expansion should also not to be underestimated; particularly noteworthy is the presence of a contribution on the protreptic speeches during the Tand dynasty (618–907: D.A. Graff’s paper).
It is only natural that any volume dealing with generalship should include Homer, who is at the roots of Western culture also with regards to warfare. Kucewicz's essay clearly highlights the characteristics of the individual heroic ethos represented in the Iliad and in the archaic poetry, as well as the relational mechanisms operating within the army. These mechanisms include, above all, the relationship between the general and his soldiers and therefore the importance of protreptic speeches before battle. Two qualities are essential for Homeric commanders: to be valiant in battle, meaning to fight heroically in individual hand-to-hand combat, and to be a good orator. This latter feature is often present in the Homeric poems and its importance underlined. The commanders of the Iliad speak to the troops, exhort, and encourage them with various topics. For the most part, these are paraineseis with a simple and uncoded structure, or also instructions concerning the contingent situation. Sometimes the exhortation is preceded by a rebuke or some considerations about the present or past situation.
Other food for thought arises from the essays of this volume, e.g. from N. Rockwell’s contribution. This work, although focusing mainly on the relationship between political leaders and generals, offers a rich repertoire of passages where Plato reflects on issues of warfare. A specific and dedicated study on the Platonic idea of leadership would have been incongruous in a miscellaneous book, considering the limited space, and taking into account both the places where Plato explicitly deals with leadership, and especially all those where he deals with military topics in various ways, using them as examples or metaphors. In any case, the repertoire of passages offered by the author is significant. To these places I would add the dialogue between Laches and Socrates which define courage in war (Lach. 190e–194c) and especially Socrates’ speech to Adimantus in Book VI of the Republic (488a–e), which uses the well-known allegory of the ship to represent the state.
Elements of Platonic philosophy are indeed present in the Strategikos, but also in many principles of the Greek and Roman treatises on leadership: one has only to look for them. Among these principles, we might underline the value of competence and knowledge, which is an area still to be fully investigated, as Taylor rightly points out. On this topic, it would be useful to consider the chapters of Cicero’s Pro Lege Manilia (28–49), where the virtues of a general like Pompey are defined as scientia militaris, virtus, auctoritas and felicitas, but also labor in negotiis, fortitudo in periculis, industria in agendo, celeritas in conficiendo, temperantia, consilium in providendo, fides, ingenium, humanitas.
The felicitas evoked by Cicero identifies another important conceptual area regarding leadership, upon which Nolan’s chapter focuses. The author examines the role and use of the word fortuna (meaning both luck and chance) in Caesar’s De bello Gallico. Caesar’s evaluation of the events could be better judged based on the definition Caesar himself gives to the structure and workings of chance in war. It would be opportune to read two passages in the De bello civili. In the first (BC I,21.1), which is a genuine apophthegm, Caesar states that saepe in bello parvis momentis magni casus intercederant. This is not simply a general reflection, here Caesar recognizes a principle which has a great value in war, and therefore finds ample space in ancient strategic theories (see, e.g., Onasander, Strategikos, pr. 6).
The volume also contains case studies, especially in chapters 4 and 8. The first (A. McAuley’ essay) focuses on the figure of Alexander of Sardis and then examines the characteristics of leadership in the reign of the Seleucids in the period 301–222, shedding light on an interesting declination of the concept of leadership, demonstrating how wide the semantic spectrum of the term στρατηγός was in the ancient world. D. Potter’s chapter concerns the Gothic campaign of the emperor Decius and the battle of Abritus, where Decius died. The examination of literary sources is linked to the review of archaeological evidence and the evaluation of fragments discovered a few years ago in the palimpsest codex Vindobonensis Hist. gr. 73, showing how the integration of evidence from different sources can be useful for understanding and reconstructing episodes of war.
Finally, essays by C. Whately and Ph. Rance combine theoretical aspects and case studies in a very interesting way. The reconstruction of the salient phases of the battles of Strasbourg and Adrianople allows Whately to highlight the characteristics that the figure of the commander assumed in the 4th century AD. Ammianus Marcellinus was an expert in military matters, who focused on tactical-strategic aspects that were decisive in the defeat of Valens at Adrianople and also in Julian's success at Strasbourg. Through these figures, Whately demonstrates how the evolution of strategic thought had led to the definition of the war-manager general. The process of this evolution from general fellow-soldier to war-manager can be said to have been perfectly accomplished in the 4th century, but the beginnings are already evident in earlier military theories, set out not only in Onasander's Strategikos, but also in Frontinus' Strategemata.
It is therefore opportune to emphasize, as Philip Rance does in his chapter, how closely Byzantine military thought was linked to this tradition, and in particular to the figure of the commander outlined by Onasander. The characteristics of war in Byzantium make this connection necessary. It is therefore no coincidence that “the most influential section of Onasander’s Strategikos was the initial chapter ‘On choosing a general’ […]. Commencing such works with the ‘checklist’ of essential and desirable qualities became as much a rhetorical-didactic strategy as an index of contemporary educational ideals” (p. 260).
The general war-manager is certainly the model to which Byzantine commanders adapted, as the essays by S. Taugher and D. Krallis highlight. Military treaties drew directly on the principles of the past, obviously choosing those useful to a reality that required flexibility, intelligence, experience, and qualities from the commander, which were not only tactical and strategic, but also human and character based.
Ultimately, the volume’s great strength is that it provides the reader with many insights and points of interest, especially by generously providing sources and evidence for further investigation. These insights are many and varied, and do not shy away from examining negative models of the general – as in the case of Varus in D. Crosby’s essay or Valens in Whately's paper – or from reconsidering them in the light of the sources and without the filter of propaganda, as in the case of Leonidas (R. Evans’s paper).
In my opinion, the volume is a little to varied in its range of topics, and lacks a feeling of ensemble, so that in the end even the experienced reader, who has learnt a lot from each contribution, ends up not fully understanding the concept of leadership in its diachronic evolution. Nevertheless, this is not a criticism, but rather an invitation to continue along this path, adding further investigations and case studies, with the aim of presenting a clear and general picture of the concept of generalship during ancient times. One small recommendation would be to fully consider the importance of the many works of non-English-speaking authors which are devoted to this topic.